Personal identity after death is a fundamental issue in philosophy of religion and eschatology because responsibility, reward, and punishment depend on personal continuity. Using a descriptive-analytical method and a comparative-critical approach, this study examines Paul Tillich’s symbolic model of resurrection and Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli’s theory of the soul and eschatological body. The findings show that Tillich rejects naturalistic interpretations of resurrection and emphasizes the psychophysical and historical totality of the human being, explaining afterlife existence through participation in divine life and essentialization. However, the basis for numerical continuity of the same subject remains insufficiently explicit. By contrast, Javadi-Amoli regards the individuated soul as the bearer of personal continuity, while its acquired quality, shaped through knowledge, intention, choice, and action, connects earthly identity with afterlife existence. The comparison indicates that Javadi-Amoli provides a more explicit ontological basis for numerical personal identity, although the relation between earthly and eschatological bodies still requires clarification.