Bodily resurrection and the persistence of human identity are foundational topics in theology and the philosophy of religion. Using an analytic-comparative approach, this study examines Allama al-Hilli’s and John Hick’s accounts of bodily resurrection and the criterion for the persistence of personal identity. The central question is how each thinker, on the basis of his anthropological and theological premises, explains the possibility of human return and the preservation of personal identity. Drawing on a demonstration of resurrection grounded in human nature, Allama al-Hilli advances the theory of the “principal parts of the body” as the basis for the continuity of human identity. On this view, by denying the re-creation of the nonexistent, the endurance of the body’s principal parts underwrites existential continuity and makes bodily resurrection possible. By contrast, John Hick, rejecting substance dualism and emphasizing the psychosomatic unity of the human being, proposes the theory of “re-creation” or “replica,” which locates continuity in the persistence of consciousness, memory, and character through the divine creation of a new body. While both accounts affirm the corporeality of resurrection, they offer two distinct models of identity persistence: existential continuity grounded in the endurance of principal parts, and structural continuity grounded in re-creation. The study argues that a judicious synthesis of these approaches can provide a more comprehensive framework for explaining personal identity in bodily resurrection.